

# Delaware SREC Procurement: Program Design in the Context of Industry Practice and Statutory Objectives

Presentation to the  
Subcommittee of the Renewable Energy Task Force

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# Overview

- ◆ Review draft subcommittee SREC procurement program design in context of:
  - Applicable Delaware statutory provisions
  - Industry practice—what is being done in other states?
- ◆ Underlying premises:
  - There is much to be learned from experience in other states
  - Recommendations of the Renewable Energy Task Force should be based on:
    - Knowledge of industry practice in other states
    - Conditions in Delaware
    - The goals and constraints set forth in applicable Delaware legislation

# Renewable Energy Task Force

- ◆ Purpose: to make recommendations about the establishment of trading mechanisms and other structures to support the growth of renewable energy markets in Delaware (Senate Substitute 1 for Senate Bill 119)
- ◆ Pertinent legislative criteria re SREC procurement:
  - Balanced market mechanism for SREC trading
  - Revenue certainty for investments in renewable energy technologies
    - Long-term contracts and auction mechanisms to be considered
  - Aggregation mechanisms and other devices to encourage renewables deployment with least impact on entities making retail electric sales
  - Cost minimization (1% trigger for SREC costs /retail electricity costs)
  - Design so that different scale solar PV investments are financially viable and cost-effective
  - Maximize in-state renewable energy generation and local manufacturing

# Subcommittee Proposal: Key Features

- ◆ SREC procurement program scope
  - Delmarva Power share—standard offer service only—and DE Electric Cooperative
  - Long-term contracting—20 year term
  - Pilot: one year
- ◆ Four tiers based on project size
  - Allocation of SRECs to each tier
  - No SREC procurement for Tier 4 (2 MW and higher)—Dover Sun Park a factor
- ◆ Role of Sustainable Energy Utility (“SEU”)
  - Administer procurement for Tiers 1 (up to 50 kW), 2 (to 500 kW) and 3 (to 2 MW)
  - Contracting party for Tiers 1-3, with resale to utilities (Tier 4—utility responsibility)
- ◆ Procurement structure
  - Administratively determined prices for Tier 1 and Tier 2
  - Competitive bidding (price only) for Tier 3

# Subcommittee Proposal: Key Features Continued

- ◆ Price—20-year term with 5:1+ frontloading
  - Tier 1: \$290 for 1<sup>st</sup> 10 years; \$50 for 2<sup>nd</sup> 10 years
  - Tier 2: \$270 for 1<sup>st</sup> 10 years; \$50 for 2<sup>nd</sup> 10 years
  - Sellers get benefit of 2 10% SREC multipliers (in-state manufacturing/installation)
- ◆ Delmarva Power SOS procurement by tiers
  - Tier 1: 3,464 SRECs (20%)
  - Tier 2: 6,062 SRECs (35%)
  - Tier 3: 7,794 SRECs (45%)
  - Tier 4: 0 SRECs ( 0%)
- ◆ Use of standard contracts; back-to-back sales to utilities
- ◆ Residential host can't be seller
- ◆ Eligibility, bid deposit, other terms and conditions

# Long-Term Contracts and Financing of Renewable Energy Projects

- ◆ REC and SREC market prices, at least during early RPS years, were high in a number of states with competitive retail markets
- ◆ The lack of long-term contracts made financing difficult resulting in a shortage and a higher risk premium for developers
- ◆ A number of states initiated long-term contracting programs
  - Connecticut (Project 150)
  - Massachusetts (Green Communities Act chapter 83)
  - New York—NYSERDA (started at beginning of RPS)
  - New Jersey—SREC procurement program for 3 utilities (including Delmarva Power affiliate, Atlantic City Electric)
  - Pennsylvania—utility SREC procurement for default service (recent)
- ◆ RPS States without competitive retail markets have ongoing utility long-term contracting programs for bundled products

## Tiers; Competitively Determined vs. Administratively Determined Pricing

- ◆ SRECs conceptually represent the difference between the cost to build & operate a solar PV project minus the energy and capacity value of the project—the renewable premium
- ◆ SRECs are a market-oriented approach to embody the renewable premium of solar PV projects
- ◆ Procurements for SRECs/RECs are mostly market-oriented; more broadly, programs to incent solar vary considerably
- ◆ Project size and relationships to other incentives—grants, net metering, etc.—are economic factors
- ◆ Other states have considered similar issues as Delaware in designing programs pertaining to solar/SREC procurement

# New Jersey SREC Procurement

- ◆ 3 utilities procure SRECs in a single process with a solicitation manager
- ◆ Two segments:
  - up to 50 kW (up to now, eligible for grants)
  - up to 500 kW (not eligible for grants)
- ◆ Projects must be interconnected w/ NJ distribution system (RPS)
- ◆ Aspirational goal that 25% of projects be up to 50 kW in size
- ◆ Prices are competitively bid; the utilities are the contracting parties
- ◆ Term: 10 to 15 year contracts; utilities resell SRECs (don't retire them)
- ◆ Standard contracts-SREC only
- ◆ Results: mixed; uneven participation with some under-subscription
  - 20.5 MW of solar PV projects—average price of 10-year contracts over \$400
  - High SREC spot prices---~\$600, interconnection issues?



# Pennsylvania SREC Procurement

- ◆ PA PUC issues final policy statement in September 2010 after receiving comments on a proposed policy statement in December 2009
- ◆ Utilities to enter into long-term SREC contracts (5-20 years) to remove barrier of price uncertainty for solar project development;
- ◆ Utilities to procure SRECs from large-scale solar projects—200 kW and larger—through competitive RFP process
- ◆ Utilities to procure SRECs from small projects (less than 200 kW) by:
  - RFP process (competitively bid); or
  - Bilateral contracts at prices not to exceed Commission-approved average winning bid price in most recent RFP for large-scale projects
- ◆ Standardized contracts to be developed
- ◆ PECO RFP results (March 2010): 10-year contracts for 80,000 SRECs/year at average price of \$256.57 (proposals: 300 SREC/year minimum)

# Maryland SREC Procurement

- ◆ SREC procurement as part of SOS generally on a spot market basis
- ◆ Stakeholder working group to address renewables procurement approach (as part of Procurement Improvement Process)
- ◆ The Solar Alliance (Aug. 2010) suggests review of:
  - NJ RFP results—10-year SREC purchases
  - PECO SREC RFP results
  - Market data SREC costs
  - Alternative Compliance Payment costs
- ◆ MD RPS rule
  - If an electricity supplier purchases SRECs directly from a solar PV on-site generator, the contract term may not be less than 15 years
  - If the on-site solar PV's capacity is 10 kW or less, the electricity supplier shall purchase the SRECs by a single upfront payment

# California IOU Solar PV Procurement

- ◆ CA RPS: California Public Utilities Commission requires 3 major IOUs to conduct annual procurements for PPAs for bundled energy and RECs
- ◆ Renewable projects of up to 1.5 MW entitled to PPA at avoided cost rate that is administratively determined (long-term cost of gas plant—MPR)
- ◆ Southern California Edison Company:
  - Renewable Standard Contract program—up to 20 MW
    - 2009: at MPR rate (10-20 year contracts)
    - 2010—competitively bid—price only (10-20 year contracts)
  - Solar PV Program—mostly rooftops: 0.5 to 2.0 MWs—competitively bid (price only)
- ◆ CPUC Renewable Auction Mechanism/RAM (Dec. 2010)—up to 20 MW
  - Standardized contracts
  - Competitively bid; administratively determined prices (feed-in tariff) rejected

# RAM: Rationale for Competitive Bidding Over Administratively-Determined Pricing

- ◆ Lowering transaction costs: buyer, seller, regulator
  - RAM: no negotiations over price or contract terms and conditions
  - Cost to determine appropriate price vs. cost savings in not bidding
- ◆ Prices that are financeable to developers but minimize ratepayer costs
  - Administratively-determined prices can be too high or too low
  - Potential cost savings from competition
- ◆ Ability to respond quickly to market changes
  - Bidding is superior
  - Significant changes in costs can occur following administrative determinations
- ◆ Promoting the development of long-term sustainable market
  - Prices set too high can result in hostility to solar development
  - Prices set too low can result in insufficient financing and construction of projects

# RAM: Project Viability/Threshold Requirements

Purpose of threshold requirements and seller performance/security obligations is to minimize contracting with non-viable projects

- ◆ Demonstration of site control upon submitting bid
- ◆ Developer experience
- ◆ Commercialized technology
- ◆ Filed interconnection application prior to bid submission
  - Utilities in advance of auctions to identify preferred locations
  - Utilities to update information monthly
- ◆ Ability of project to be operational within 18 months of contract approval
- ◆ Project milestones identified

# RAM: Standard Contract Terms

- ◆ On-line performance obligation:
  - 18 months to make commercial operation
  - Maximum 6-month extension
- ◆ Project development security
  - Projects up to 5 MW: \$20/kW: \$40,000 for 2 MW project
  - 5-20 MW projects: \$60/kW: \$600,000 for 10 MW project
- ◆ Operational period security
  - Projects up to 5 MW: \$20/kW
  - 5-20 MW projects: 5% of expected contractual revenues
- ◆ Operational performance obligation
  - 70% of expected production
  - Averaged over 2 years

# Other California Solar PV Programs: California Solar Initiative and Net Metering

- ◆ California Solar Initiative (“CSI”): rebate program
  - 1 kw to 1 MW: residences and businesses
  - Administered by 3 IOUs
  - Goal to produce 3,000 MW by 2017
  - Step process: declining rebate or performance payment by application type once quota is filled for an application type (e.g., existing commercial)
  - Net metering allowable with CSI incentives
- ◆ RPS, RAM, SCE RSC and SCE SPVP competitive procurements and 1.5 MW MPR-based tariff
  - Net metering not permissible
  - Can’t access CSI rebates

# States with Administratively Determined Pricing for Solar PV (no competitive retail markets)

## ◆ Feed In Tariffs (Energy and RECs)

- Vermont (FIT statute): \$240/MWh for solar PV (up to 2.2 MW)—25-year contract
  - State tax credit; no grants
- Hawaii—20-year contracts for solar PV; no net metering; state tax credit
  - Tier 1—less than 20 kW--\$218/MWh
  - Tier 2—up to 500 kW--\$189/MWh
  - Tier 3—up to 5 MW on Oahu—not yet determined

## ◆ Colorado: Xcel Energy—current step pricing by tier (as of 1/4/2010)

- Customer-owned systems up to 10.0 kW: \$2.35/W upfront
- Third-party-owned systems up to 10 kW DC: \$60/MWh over 20 years + rebate (\$2.00/W)
- Customer- or 3rd-party-owned systems up to 100 kW : \$25/MWh (20 yrs) + rebate
- Customer- or 3rd-party-owned systems up to 500 kW: \$35/MWh (20 yrs) + max. \$200,000 rebate
- Customer- or 3rd-party-owned systems > 500 kW: determined through competitive bidding

\*Note: Pricing in different states may not be comparable due to differences in product (bundled vs. SREC), insolation (capacity factor), state tax rates/credits/grants/rebates,/property taxes, availability of net metering and other factors



# Proposed Program Features in Context of Industry Practice and Legislative Objectives: 20-Year SREC Contracts

- ◆ Strong industry practice supporting long-term contracts
- ◆ 20-year contracts within typical range of 10-25 years
- ◆ Consistency with legislative objectives:
  - Revenue assurance for developer/sellers
  - Cost minimization
    - Longer term can provide for lower annual costs
    - Renewable premium can be amortized over a longer period
    - May facilitate longer debt financing period for developers
  - Lower costs should minimize contribution to reaching of 1% SREC trigger as percentage of retail energy costs

# Proposed Program Features in Context of Industry Practice and Legislative Objectives: Tiering

- ◆ Tiering in the context of industry practice:
  - SRECs in retail competition states: practice varies
    - Definition of tiers;
    - Procurement rules re competitive bidding/contracting
  - RPS states with utility procurements for bundled energy and RECs
    - Procurements/programs are often segmented/tiered
    - Provisions against “double dipping”
  - 4 tiers is a large # relative to industry practice
- ◆ Consistency with legislative objectives:
  - Pros
    - Fosters development of different scale solar PV investments (but not largest)
    - Maximize in-state renewable energy generation and local manufacturing
  - Cons
    - Smaller projects have higher costs
    - Might cause reaching 1% cost trigger sooner

# Proposed Program Features in Context of Industry Practice and Legislative Objectives: Bid vs. Administratively Determined Pricing

- ◆ Industry practice:
  - SREC procurements in retail competition states:
    - Competitive procurement is the norm
    - Smaller projects can get other benefits (rebates/net metering/use of RFP results for pricing)
  - RPS states with utility procurements for bundled energy and RECs
    - Competitive procurement is the norm for “larger projects” (definition varies)
    - Administratively determined prices is not uncommon for “smaller projects” (definition varies)
- ◆ Consistency with legislative objectives: Administratively determined pricing for projects up to 500 kW (rather than competitively bid pricing)
  - Is it a market mechanism?
  - Impact on costs and benefits to ratepayers, industry participants, hosts, buyers, state agencies?
  - If administratively determined pricing is desired, are the proposed prices appropriate?

# Proposed Program Features in Context of Industry Practice and Legislative Objectives: Frontloaded Pricing

- ◆ Industry practice:
  - Frontloaded SREC pricing is rare, especially to the degree proposed
  - Pricing is normally flat or escalating
  - Reasons:
    - Want strong performance incentive over the entire contract term
    - Desire not to aggravate rate impacts in near term
- ◆ Consistency with legislative objectives:
  - Pros
    - Higher prices in first 10 contract years provide more revenue certainty for sellers
  - Cons
    - Higher costs in early years: might cause reaching 1% trigger sooner than necessary
    - Minimizes performance incentives in contract years 11-20

# Proposed Program Features in Context of Industry Practice and Legislative Objectives: Role of the SEU

## ◆ Industry practice:

- Third-party procurement administrators are uncommon but not unprecedented (NJ)
- Government-sponsored procurement has been conducted in limited circumstances
  - MA Technology Collaborative's Green Power Partnership Program (utilities unwilling to contract long term)
  - NYSERDA REC procurements under the New York RPS (NYSERDA was well-established state authority)
  - VT: state-appointed entity is contracting party for 20 utilities under PURPA/buyer of last resort under FIT
- MA: state agency coordinates joint utility RFP—utilities evaluate bids and sign PPAs

## ◆ Consistency with legislative objectives:

### ■ Pros

- The SEU as an aggregation mechanism; potential benefits of enhanced banking
- Could reduce effort required by utilities

### ■ Cons

- Absent backstopping by utilities, a long-term contract with the SEU may raise issues of financeability or costs of financing for developers
- Impact on costs unclear; may add to legal, administrative and perhaps SREC costs

# Proposed Program Features in Context of Industry Practice and Legislative Objectives: Threshold Requirements and Security Deposits

- ◆ Industry practice:
  - Threshold/viability standards and security deposits established to minimize risk of non-viable projects
  - Unclear what is being proposed—more work needed
- ◆ Consistency with legislative objectives:
  - Want to deter proposals/selection of proposals that have low likelihood of success
  - Want costs to be at a reasonable level

# Proposed Program Features in Context of Industry Practice and Legislative Objectives: Standard Contracts

- ◆ Industry practice:
  - Standardized contracts, with no or minimal negotiation, will expedite procurement
  - Non-negotiable price bidding or FIT pricing will expedite procurement
  - Drafting standard contracts, particularly with multiple utilities/buyers, will take time
- ◆ Consistency with legislative objectives:
  - Want ability to remove “deadwood” projects; allow for viable projects to go forward
  - Want costs to be at a reasonable level

# Other Questions

- ◆ Eligible applicants—exclusion of homeowners/small project owners
- ◆ Criteria for determining project size
- ◆ Relationship between host and applicant and SREC contract
  - Survivability of SREC contract if the SEU terminates contract with aggregator
  - Must host be paid by aggregator over time for SRECs?
- ◆ Independent Monitor (“IM”) and role:
  - Selection/contracting process
  - Reporting relationship and treatment of confidential information
- ◆ Procurement/contracting roles and costs:
  - SEU role; retention of procurement manager(s) and IM; budget for procurements, including legal costs; mechanism for compensating the SEU
  - Who will oversee/administer/enforce SREC contracts? What are the associated costs?
- ◆ Ongoing role of the Task Force